CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
JACKSON V. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION:
TITLE IX'S IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
RETALIATION
The Supreme Court has penned countless words about the sound
of statutory silence.' On March 29, 2005, the Court once again grappled with the meaning of silence in a statute, splitting along familiar
5-4 lines in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.2 When the dust
cleared, a male coach of a high school girls' basketball team, who was
fired in retaliation for protecting his players' Title IX 3 rights, possessed a private right of action arising from the statute itself. 4 Although the Court has retreated from its high-water mark of implying

See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981) (addressing "the recurring question whether Congress intended to create a private right
of action under a federal statute without saying so explicitly"); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S.
677, 730 (1979) (Powell,J., dissenting) ("The time has come to reappraise our standards for the
judicial implication of private causes of action."); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
130-31 (1944) ("Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in
the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight
to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where
the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function
is limited.") (citations omitted); S. Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,J., dissenting) ("The only authority available is the common law or statutes of the state.... [T]he
natural inference is that, in the silence of Congress, this court has believed the very limited law
of the sea to be supplemented here as in England by the common law.. . ."); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) ("[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any
clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of
power, and not an exercise of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a
treaty. Neither can this Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law. We are
to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that
stops-whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind."); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is .... and interpret that rule."); Stephen Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 847 (1992) (discussing the
need for courts to continue using legislative history in interpreting statutory law as such interpretations "tend to make the law itself more coherent, workable, or fair. . .
2 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
3 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (2000).
4 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1507 (reasoning that "the text of Title IX prohibits a funding
recipient from retaliating against a person who speaks out against sex discrimination," therefore the
Court need not rely on regulations promulgated under that statute because "the statute itself
contains the necessary prohibition" against retaliation).
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private rights of action,5 in the Jackson decision it advanced private
rights that had been previously implied.
While the majority and dissent agreed "that plaintiffs may not assert claims under Title IX for conduct not prohibited by that statute,"
the two opinions "part[ed] ways with regard to [their] reading of the
statute. '' 6 Title IX prohibits federally-funded education programs
from discriminating based on sex.7 The majority interpreted Title
IX's text "to clearly prohibit retaliation for complaints about sex discrimination,"" even if such complaints were made by an individual
not personally subjected to the discrimination. 9 The dissent refused
to find a private right of action for retaliation in the statute.
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. In one of her final five
opinions for the Court before announcing her resignation," Justice
O'Connor engaged in classic statutory interpretation: assuming ajudicial role of effectuating congressional intent by gleaning meaning
from Title IX. 2 The majority held that "Title IX's private right of action encompasses suits for retaliation, because retaliation falls within
the statute's prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis of
sex." 13 Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion was embraced by the remainder of the Court, who found their collective hands tied by congressional silence, leaving them unwilling to join the majority in a
structural and contextual reading of the statute. 4 The dissenting justices intimated that separation of powers requires judicial abdication
to prevent judicial usurpation of Congress's exclusive power to au-

5 See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (implying a private
right of action
based on a statute's protective purpose despite that its "language makes no specific reference to
a private right of action").
Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1507 n.2 ("[T]he private plaintiff may not bring a 10b-5 suit against
a
defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b)." (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994)).
7 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (2000).
' Id.
Id. at 1507.
toSee also Dodd v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2478 (2005); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 125 S.
Ct. 2398
(2005); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 125 S.Ct. 1528
(2005).
1 See William Branigin et al.,
Supreme CourtJustice O'Connor Resigns, WASHINGTON POST, July
1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/
AR2005070100653.html.
12 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1507 (finding that "the text of Title IX prohibits
a funding recipient
from retaliating against a person who speaks out against sex discrimination, because such retaliation is intentional 'discrimination' 'on the basis of sex'").
13Id.

14 Id. at 1513 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]hat the text of Title IX does not mention retaliation is significant .... Congress' failure to include [separate provisions directly addressing retaliation] in Title IX shows that it did not authorize private retaliation actions.").
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thorize rights of action. 5 The O'Connor team, however, did not view

silence as evidence of hostility"' and assumed the judicial role of effectuating congressional intent,'7 rather than abdicating its interpretive power.
Petitioner's complaint alleged these facts: Respondent, the Board
of Education of Birmingham, Alabama-a recipient of federal
funds-hired Petitioner Roderick Jackson as a girls' basketball coach
in 1993.18 In 1999, he became coach of the Ensley High School girls'

basketball team. As coach, Jackson noticed that the girls' team received less funding than the boys' program and, unlike the boys'
team, was denied a key to access the practice facilities.' When Jackson complained to his supervisors in 2000 about this Title IX discrimination, his protests fell on deaf ears. 0 Instead of corrective action, Jackson's supervisors were moved to reaction, issuing negative
evaluations of his work and removing him from the coaching position
in May of 2001.21
Jackson's case raised issues of what conduct "discrimination" encompasses, as well as who may bring suit to redress such discrimination "on the basis of sex" under Title IX. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed his complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that Title IX did not authorize retaliation claims.22 A unanimous
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, holding that the private right of action under
the United States Department of Education's anti-retaliation reulation 23 was unenforceable because it exceeded Title IX's language.
Id. at 1517 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the majority returns this Court to the days in which it created remedies out of whole cloth
to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose. In doing so, the majority substitutes its policy
judgments for the bargains struck by Congress, as reflected in the statute's text. The question
before us is only whether Title IX prohibits retaliation, not whether prohibiting it is good policy." (citation omitted)).
16 Id. at 1505 ("Because Congress did not list any specific discriminatory
practices when it
wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice does not tell us anything about whether
it intended that practice to be covered [by the statute].").
17 Id. at 1507-08 (examining "the backdrop against which Congress
enacted Tire IX" and
why Congress enacted the statute, as well as highlighting what "Congress intended Tide IX's
private right of action to encompass").
is Brief of the Petitioner at 4,Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672).
19 Id. at 4-5.
2o Id. at 5.
1

21 Id.
22 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. CV-01-TMP-1866-S, 2002 WL
32668124, at *2
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2002). Because this case did not survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the petitioner's complaint are assumed true for
purposes of Supreme Court review, but they must be proven over the respondent's affirmative
defenses on remand. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1502-03.
23 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2004).
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The case presented the Court with several narrow questions regarding the scope of Title IX: Does Title IX prohibit retaliatory dis-5
crimination against those who bring complaints for its enforcement?
If so, does the statute also protect whistle-blowers who were not personally subjected to the underlying discrimination? 6 The majority
answered "yes" to both questions.27 For the dissenters, the28 absence of
explicit reference to retaliation in the statute meant "no.,
The case also presented more existential, overarching questions:
What do words mean? How do we proceed in the presence of ambiguity? What did Congress want in 1970? What should we do about it
today? What types of interaction should we promote between statute
and regulation, between private and public entities, and between the
three branches of government? Which mode will prevail in the battle
over statutory interpretation?
The decision in Jackson substantially raised the stakes for many
players. For the Justices, both the role of the Court in the constitutional scheme, as well as the proper method of interpreting federal
statutes were at issue. The United States government and its agencies
saw their ability to delegate enforcement of important rights-creating
statutes and conditional spending programs at stake.
For local
school boards, the decision would affect liability for alleged retaliatory employment actions.m Teachers, professors, women's sports
coaches, and civil rights activists saw the effective enforcement of Ti-

24Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)
(stating that
neither Title IX, nor the corresponding sections of the Code of Federal Regulations implies a
private right of action for retaliation).
25 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1502 ("We consider here whether the private right of action
implied

by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation.").
Id. at 1507 ("Nor are we convinced by the [Respondent's] argument that, even if Title
IX's private right of action encompasses discrimination, [Petitioner] is not entitled to invoke it
because he is an 'indirect victi[m]' of sex discrimination." (citation omitted)).
27 Id. at 1502 ("We hold that [the statute] does [encompass claims of retaliation]
where the
funding recipient retaliates against an individual because he has complained about sex discrimination.").
28 See id. at 1510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Title IX] prohibits [retaliation] only
if it falls
within § 901's prohibition against discrimination 'on the basis of sex.' It does not."); Id. at 1512
("A victim of sexual harassment suffers discrimination because of her own sex, not someone
else's ....Jackson's retaliation claim lacks the connection to actual sex discrimination that the
statute requires.").
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,Jackson, 125 S.
Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (submitted at the Court's request).
50 See Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Ass'n, Alabama Ass'n of School
Boards,
American Ass'n of School Administrators, American Ass'n of Presidents of Independent Colleges & Universities, & Ass'n of Southern Baptist Colleges & Schools in Support of Respondent
at 2, Jackson, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to further their "critical interest in
reducing wasteful litigation against public schools and other institutions").
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tle IX and other civil rights hanging in the balance..3 1 Those who perceived zealous enforcement of Title IX as overly detrimental to men's
sports saw the potential for further harm in the outcome of the case. 32
For proponents of Title IX rights, the decision's outcome threatened
the statute's continued vitality and enforcement. 33 For Jackson and
other educators and coaches, protection of their livelihood from retaliatory actions was at issue. For the Ensley High School girls' basketball team, the Court held the keys to equal equipment and playing
time. For other interested observers, the quantity and quality of
precedent in the heated federalism debate could be tipped by the
decision. 4
In the end, the Court vindicated rights against discrimination,
recognized the profound threat retaliation posed to Title IX en-

31See

Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Ass'n, American Ass'n of University

Professors, American Volleyball Coaches Ass'n, National Fastpitch Coaches Ass'n, Intercollegiate Women's Lacrosse Coaches Ass'n, & Women's Basketball Coaches Ass'n in Support of Petitioner at 2,Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to illustrate why enforcement
of Title IX "depends on ensuring that teachers, professors, coaches, school administrators and
students are protected from retaliation for reporting Title IX violations or for supporting Title
IX claims"); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of College Sports Council in Support of Neither Party
at 1, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating neutrally on the important questions
of "whether the law should protect coaches and other educators who champion the fights of
the students in their charge" and "whether litigation is the best, or at least the first, way to resolve disputes"); Brief of Amicus Curiae Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in Support of
Petitioner at 2, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to voice its "unequivocal
judgment ... that a remedy for reprisal discrimination is indispensable to the efficient, effective
enforcement of Title IX, and of federal anti-discrimination laws generally").
32 See Amicus Curiae Brief of National Wrestling Coaches Ass'n in Support of Respondent
at
1, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to "support its campaign to bring balance back to Title IX implementation and enforcement" and to address the perceived risks of
"driving schools out of athletics altogether" if a private right of action for retaliation is implied
under Title IX).
33 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Birch Bayh in Support of the Petitioner at 1,Jackson, 125 S. Ct.
1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating in his capacity as former Indiana Senator, author and sponsor of Title IX, and amicus curiae in previous Title IX cases to further his "life long commitment to... equal rights for women"); Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Partnership for
Women & Families & 31 Other Organizations and Individuals in Support of Petitioner at 2,
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to serve their "vital interest in effectuating
Title IX's original intent of broad and effective protection against gender discrimination in
education" and to illuminate the intent behind Title IX).
34 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund
in Support of
Respondent at 1-2,Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to "protect educational
opportunity against government interference," to advocate for "enhancing opportunities for
men and women without ignoring important differences between the genders," and to espouse
"limiting the power of the federal government and promoting individual liberty and free enterprise"); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent at 1-2, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672) (participating to "provide an additional viewpoint" on the
issues raised from the perspective of its purported clientele including "mainstream Americans
who believe in limited government, private property rights, individual freedom, and free enterprise").
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forcement, and produced an opinion with a depth of statutory interpretation rarely seen in the past decade of its jurisprudence.
I
The Jackson Court initially addressed whistle-blowing under antidiscrimination statutes and regulations. Title IX and Department of
Education regulation 34 C.F.R. § 106.713" apply to the complaint and
alleged retaliation at issue in Jackson. Title IX states that "[n] o person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 3 6
Title IX also empowers the federal agencies
providing the financial assistance to "effectuate" the statute, by authorizing them to issue and enforce "rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability. 3 7 The Department of Education's regulation
prohibits retaliation for attempts to enforce Title IX, providing that:
No recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or dis-

criminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any
right or privilege secured by section 601 of the Act or this part, or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part.38

Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to its Spending Clause""
power. "The national spending power is probably the most important of all Art. I, § 8 powers in its impact on the actual functioning of
the federal system.
Although somewhat restricted in its scope, the
3534 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2004) (incorporating 34 C.F.R.

§ 100.7(e) (2004), the procedural
regulations applicable to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
3620 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2000).
37 20 U.S.C. § 1682
(2000).
M 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004) (incorporated into Title IX regulations by 34 C.F.R. § 106.71
(2004)).

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect

Taxes ... to... provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States.... .").
40 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
210 (4th ed. 2001); cf

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (describing Spending Clause
legislation as "in the nature of a contract" between the federal, state, and local governments so
that state and local recipients' acceptance of the contract's terms and liabilities must be both
voluntary and knowing to be valid); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (reiterating the
same).
41 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding
that Congress may not use
its spending powers to compel state officers to execute federal laws); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (rejecting Congress's use of its spending powers to regulate intrastate activity
when that activity has no substantial impact on intrastate commerce); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that, in order for Congress to validly exercise its spending
power, the conditions attached to the distribution of federal funds must bear some relationship
to the purpose of federal spending); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (limiting Congress's spending power with the caveats that power must be exercised for the general welfare,
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Spending Clause contains far-reaching powers to coerce state and individual behavior through conditional grants. 2 The Jackson majority
and the United States' amicus brief both focus on this functioning
and the role that a private right of action for retaliation (from the
text of the statute and from the administrative regulations) will play
in that functioning.43
Access to the purse generated by the Taxation Clause 44 comes with
purse strings authorized by the Spending Clause. Thus, an institution
which receives federal funds may not intentionally discriminate on
the basis of sex. The broadly-drafted statutory prohibition on "discrimination... on the basis of sex" has found equally broad interpretations by the Supreme Court's Title IX jurisprudence defining discrimination and the proper remedies for that discrimination.45

the condition must be stated unambiguously, and the grant must not be barred by other constitutional provisions); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 because the statute conditionally appropriated federal money to indirectly induce compliance in an area of conduct within state control); see also Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995) (discussing the impact
of Lopez's rational basis requirement on the types of actions upon which Congress may condition grants); cf Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judiciary
should inquire whether the requirement is indeed a condition or whether it is a regulation, because Congress's conditions must relate to the expenditure of federal funds).
42 See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 211 (holding that Congress may not only attach conditions
on the receipt of federal funds, but that it may also condition funds to achieve goals it could not
achieve directly, as long as the conditions are not so coercive as to turn into compulsion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (abdicating the decision about what spending grants will promote the general welfare to Congress in upholding the Federal Election Campaign Act);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act's age benefits provisions); Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Spending
Clause constitutionality of the Social Security Act's unemployment compensation provisions);
see also Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103
(1987) (tracking the growth in federal conditional grant programs and the detail of the conditions accompanying grants).
43 E.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1508 (2005) (agreeing that
achieving the objective of preventing federal money from supporting discrimination "would be
difficult, if not impossible" without a private right of action for retaliation (quoting Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 13)); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 1 (describing the "[i]nterest of the United States" as piqued by the Department of Justice's role in coordinating and
implementing enforcement of Title IX); Id. at 13-14 ("Effective protection against retaliation is
particularly important because of Title IX's enforcement structure" which "necessarily depends
on ... agencies and recipients receiving actual knowledge of the underlying discrimination.").
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect
Taxes... to... provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States .... ").
45 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (including student-on-

student sexual harassment in Title IX discriminatory conduct); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998) (including funding recipients' deliberate indifference to
sexual harassment by a student within Title IX's actionable conduct); Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (holding sexual harassment falls within the intentional discrimination actionable under Title IX); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
521 (1982) (requiring construing courts to grant Title IX a "sweep as broad as its language").
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The Supreme Court first recognized an implied private right of
action under Tide IX in its 1979 case, Cannon v. University of Chicago.46
In the years since Title IX's enactment, however, the Court has developed an extreme reluctance to imply a right of action without
clearly expressed congressional intent to create one.47 Cannon
opened the door to private rights of action under Title IX before the
Court escalated to its highly restrictive approach, which follows the
ascension of federalism and separation of powers arguments. 48 Those
who wished to sue under Tide IX did not have to depend solely on
fortuitous timing to receive an implied private right of action from
the Supreme Court. The statute also possesses attributes the Court
relies upon to infer congressional intent to create a remedy: strong
support from the contemporaneous legal context and overlap with an
area in which common law or legislation already recognized a private
remedy.49
After finding the right of action, the Jackson Court subsequently
defined the "contours of that right of action." 5° Private parties may
seek monetary damages under Title IX, as well as enforcement

46 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
47 CompareJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (creating a private right
of action

in the absence of express congressional authorization if private damages suits would aid in accomplishing legislative purpose), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) ("Having
sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last drink," and therefore denying a private right of action for violation of
administrative regulations beyond the statute's ambit), and Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 645-46 (1981) (refusing to imply a private cause of action without clear
congressional authorization in the Sherman Antitrust Act, a statute effectuated by federal common law), and Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1979) (Powell,J., dissenting) (advocating for an approach even more restrictive than the majority's which would deny a right of
action absent "the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent"), and Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) (requiring affirmative evidence of congressional intent to create a private remedy, and, finding none, admonishing that "the inquiry ends
there"), and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (dictating detailed inquiry into congressional
intent before implying a right of action, and determining whether the implied cause of action is
one traditionally relegated to state law).
48 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578 ("[TIn a series of cases since Borak we have adhered
to a
stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter standard today. The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court
thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." (internal
citation omitted)).
49 See, e.g.,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82
(1982) (assuming Congress intended the statute to preserve, rather than foreclose, a remedy
which existed at the time of enactment); Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (requiring analysis of four contemporaneous factors to determine congressional intent to imply a private right of action:
whether the statute creates a federal right in plaintiffs favor, whether Congress provided any
indication of its intent regarding remedies, whether implying a remedy would accord with the
legislation's purpose, and whether the remedy is one traditionally governed by state law).
50Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S.Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005).
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through equitable relief.5 Impermissible discrimination includes not
only overt discrimination, but also an institution's deliberate indiffer2
ence 5to
or its stu3 sexual harassment perpetrated by its employees
dents.
The Department of Education and Department of Justice both
promulgated regulations prohibiting retaliation for complaints of Title IX discrimination as many as thirty years ago.54 In Alexander v.
Sandoval, the Supreme Court denied enforcement of Title VI regulations because they went beyond the statutory proscription.5 Seven
years before Sandoval, the Fourth Circuit upheld enforcement of antiretaliation regulations under Title IX in Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New
River Community College.56 The Fifth Circuit agreed in Lowrey v. Texas A
& M University System.57 After Sandoval, however, two federal district
courts refused to recognize a private right of action following its rea58
soning regarding the interaction of regulation and statute.
Against this backdrop of precedent, Roderick Jackson filed his
complaint alleging that his employer, the Birmingham Board of Education, had retaliated against him in violation of Title IX. His case
raised issues of what conduct "discrimination" encompasses, as well as
who may bring suit to redress such discrimination "on the basis of
sex." The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that Title IX did
not authorize retaliation claims. 59 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal, relying on Sandoval for their holding that the private right
of action under the anti-retaliation reulation was unenforceable because it exceeded Title IX's language.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision created a circuit split.

51 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (finding that limiting
Title
IX remedies to backpay and prospective relief "conflicts with sound logic").
52 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998) (including funding
recipients' deliberate indifference to sexual harassment by a student within Title IX's actionable
conduct).
53 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (including student-onstudent sexual harassment in Title IX discriminatory conduct).
54 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004) (Dept. of Educ.); see alsoJackson, 125 S. Ct.
at 1510
("The regulations implementing Title IX clearly prohibit retaliation and have been on the
books for nearly 30 years.").
55 532 U.S. 275 (2001). The Court issued the Sandoval decision just weeks before Jackson
was fired from his coaching job.
56 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994).
57 117 F.3d 242, 253
(5th Cir. 1997).
58 Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., No. CIV.A. 01-CV-2141, 2002 WL 123449, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
29, 2002); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 584-85 (E.D. Va. 2001).
59 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. CV-01-TMP-1866-S, 2002 WL 32668124, at *2
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2002).
60 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 (1lth Cir. 2002).
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The Department of Education's anti-retaliation regulation 6 ' and
the Court's 2001 Title VI decision in Sandoval convinced the district
court and the Eleventh Circuit to seek rights of action in the regulation, rather than the text and interpretation of the Title IX statute itself. Justice O'Connor criticized the court of appeals' dismissive conclusion that retaliation does not fall within Title IX's ambit simply
because "the statute makes no mention of retaliation., 62 Illustrating
how the court of appeals ignored the momentum of the Supreme
Court's Title IX interpretations, Justice O'Connor catalogued the
Court's line of precedent that construes Title IX discrimination
broadly in congruence with the statute's language. 6
Based on a rigorous comparison with Title VI and Title VII, as well
as precedent construing private rights of action, Justice O'Connor for
the Court held that "when a funding recipient retaliates against a
person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional 'discrimination' 'on the basis of sex,' in violation of Title
IX." 64

Although it acknowledged Sandoval's relevance,

65

the Court

found that a much earlier case, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,66
provided a closer analogy to Jackson.67
The Court and advocates before it have long sought analogy to,
and distinction from, the other civil rights statutes in interpreting
61 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004) ("No recipient or other person
shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or
privilege secured by [this Act]." (incorporated into Title IX regulations by 34 C.F.R. § 106.71
(2004))).
62 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005)
(quotingJackson, 309

F.3d at 1344).
63 Id. at 1504-05. For the line of precedent discussed, see
Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999) (allowing private Title IX actions in cases of severe studenton-student sexual harassment where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to
known acts and the harasser is under the school's disciplinary authority); Gebser v. Logo Vista
Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998) (holding that a school district could be
liable for damages where it remained deliberately indifferent to teacher-student harassment of
which it had actual knowledge); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 74-75
(1992) (allowing all appropriate remedies, including monetary awards, for teacher-student sexual harassment actionable under Title IX); North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
521 (1982) ("There is no doubt that 'if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language." (quoting United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 801 (1966))).
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504.
65 Id. at 1507 ("In step with Sandoval, we hold that Title IX's private
right of action encompasses suits for retaliation, because retaliation falls within the statute's prohibition of intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex.").
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
67 See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505 (describing Sullivan's relevance);
see also Bradford C. Mank,
Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title IX Enforceable in a Private Right of Action: Does
Sandoval or Sullivan Control This Question?, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 47 (2004) (arguing that Sullivan, rather than Sandoval, controls this question, therefore indicating that Title IX requires an
implied right of action for retaliation).
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each statute's individual language. The Court has frequently used
the civil rights statutes to interpret one another, especially drawing
parallels between Titles VI and IX. 6s Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national
origin" under
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial as,,69
sistance.
Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI, and the Court
therefore infers similar intent guided Title IX's drafting.70
Although neither statute's text mentions retaliation, both agencies
administering the laws enacted anti-retaliation regulations.
The
Court measured the weight of statute and regulation for judicial interpretation in the oft-cited Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. decision. At the intersection of statutory ambiguity, clarifying regulation, and legal challenge, courts must afford
deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of statutory lan73
guage.
The Department of Justice, as amicus curiae supporting
Jackson, argued for deference to the Department of Education's antiretaliation regulation, as well as to its own identical regulation. 4 The
Department of Justice proposed that the interpretation of these regulations receive Chevron deference because that agency "has primary
responsibility for enforcing Title IX.,

7

Because the Justice Depart-

ment "is responsible
for coordinating the enforcement of Title IX by
,,76
federal agencies,
it acts much like the coach of the Title IX en68 See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (noting that because Congress modeled Title IX
after Title
VI, the two statutes operate in the same manner); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566
(1984) ("Title IX was patterned after Title VI .... The drafters of Title VI envisioned that the
receipt of student aid funds would trigger coverage, and, since they approved identical language, we discern no reason to believe that the Congressmen who voted for Title IX intended a
different result." (citations omitted)); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979)
(highlighting Titles VI and IX's similarities while using the statutes to aid in interpreting each
other).
69 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
70 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-99 (discussing
Title VI and IX's similarities).
71 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2004) (Department of Education regulation under Title
VI); 28
C.F.R. § 42.108(e) (2004) (Department ofJustice regulation under Title VI); 34 C.F.R. § 106.51
(2004) (Department of Education regulation under Tide IX).
72 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As of April 30, 2005, Chevron had 8,591 citations
in case law and administrative decisions on the Westlaw database. Westlaw also contained 5,242 citations to Chevron in law review articles. Westlaw Citing References for Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., www.westlaw.com (find citation "467 U.S. 837"; then follow "Citing References").
73 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The agency must also have authority to issue
regulations with
the "force of law" to receive Chevron deference from a reviewing court. United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221-30 (2001).
74 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29,
at 16.
75 Id. at 17.
76 Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1
(2000) (charging the Department of Justice with pan-agency coordination of Title IX enforcement); 65 Fed. Reg. 52,858 (Aug. 30, 2000) (adopting the Department of Education's antiretaliation regulation for 21 other agencies).

JOURNAL OFCONST1ITFI'IONAL LA W

[Vol. 8:1

forcement team. Therefore, the Department reasoned, the Court
should defer to the Justice Department's regulations, which mirror
those promulgated by the Department of Education.77 Although the
Department argued for deference to appropriate regulation, it put
forth an alternative argument based on the statute itself:
There is no need in this case, however, to rely on agency regulations or
principles of deference to resolve the question presented. The text,
background, and purposes of Title IX all point to the conclusion that Title IX's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex incorporates protection against retaliation. The relevant agency regulations sim78
ply reinforce that conclusion.

Frank H. Easterbrook posited that textual ambiguity in statutes invites litigation,7 9 as well as administrative agency clarification via regulation." Both of these phenomena are at work in the Jackson case. If
the agency promulgates a clarifying regulation before litigation on
the point commences, the executive branch has beaten the judicial
branch in the race to interpretation. Because agencies operate under
different pressures, constraints, and processes, their interpretation of
the statute in promulgating regulations may diverge from the judiciary's interpretation of the statute.8 ' The possible list of statutory interpreters includes agency employees, political officials, and judges.
82
Chevron instructs judges to give deference to agencies. In this com
77 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
29, at 17
("Because the Department of Justice has responsibility for coordinating the enforcement of Title IX by federal agencies, its view is likewise entitled to deference"); see also, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL 23-24 (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/
ixlegal.pdf. (tracking how "[i]n the Title IX [pan-agency] common rule, the substantive nondiscrimination obligations of recipients, for the most part, are identical to those established by
the Department of Education under Title IX").
78 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
29, at 18.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, JudicialDiscretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1
(2004) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Discretion] (discussing methods of interpretation and exercise
of discretion in adjudicating the validity of administrative regulations and extending to the
statutory context his earlier discussion about levels of generality in constitutional interpretation); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349 (1992) (discussing desirable levels of generality in constitutional interpretation); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Text, History and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63-64 (1994)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation] (concluding that statutory text and structure
are the proper foundations for finding meaning, as opposed to legislative history and intent).
go Easterbrook, Discretion,supra note 79, at 2.
8 Id. at 3 (contrasting the interpretive methodologies of "a judge with tenure" versus
"an
'expert' at an agency, or a political official serving at the President's pleasure" to highlight that
"[]udges in their own work forswear the methods that agencies employ.").
82 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissive construction of the statute.").
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plex interplay of statute, regulation, and separation of powers,
Easterbrook sees the choice not as "who does the interpretation," but
rather as "what methods of interpretationwill be applied."8 Judges arrive
at interpretation by traversing the statute's text, legislative history,
and contemporaneous case law. Agencies reach their interpretation
by a more politically charged and accountable route. 4 Therefore, by
deferring to agency determinations, judges effectively employ the
administrative process in legal interpretation. 5
Checked and balanced, the legislative branch may create a private
right of action by statute, an executive agency may promulgate rules
under that statute, and the judicial branch will defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of Congress-which do not include creation
of extra-legislative rights of action. In Sandoval, Justice Scalia removed from agencies' legitimate powers the ability to enact regulations creating private rights of action8 6 The regulation at issue in
Sandoval created a right of action for more conduct than the enabling
statute covered. 7 "Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but
not the sorcerer himself' and the Court will supervise that role-play. 8
With the Supreme Court's fresh treatment of statutory versus
regulatory rights of action in mind, 9 the Eleventh Circuit and the
Birmingham Board of Education maintained that the Court's interpretation of Title VI's language and regulations in Sandoval controlled the Title IX analysis before it in Jackson.90 The Eleventh CirEasterbrook, Discretion,supra note 79, at 3.
See id. at 8 ("Congress and the President can control bureaucrats ..... [b]ut if a judge
strays, the only remedy is more legislation-which in political terms is much more
costly."(emphasis added))
83
84

Id.

See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) ("[R]egulation may invoke a private
right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that
Congress has not.").
Compare 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2) (2004) (invoking a right of action for unintentional discrimination via disparate impact in Department ofJustice Title VI regulation), with Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding a right of action only for intentional
discrimination via disparate treatment under Title VI itself), and Note, After Sandoval: Judicial
Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774 (2003)
(discussing Sandovats denial of a private right of action for disparate impact and its implications on administrative agencies and civil rights enforcement litigation).
86

88

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.

Sandoval was decided just three years before Jackson came before the Eleventh Circuit.
Justice O'Connor and the United States as Amicus Curiae both presumed that a Supreme Court
case decided "just three years before" was profoundly present in the drafter's consciousness. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 5, 11.
90 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Our analysis
of Jackson's claim is governed in substantial measure by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Alexander v. Sandoval. . . ."). Although the district court did not mention Sandoval, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on that case to affirm the district court's decision. The Eleventh Circuit invoked Sandoval for three purposes: to determine whether to imply a right of action, to
89
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cuit construed Title IX in pari materia with Title VI to determine
was plain enough to imply a right of
whether the statute's language
9
'
not.
was
it
deciding
action,
Justice O'Connor's decision, however, avoids the mire of Chevron
deference and Sandoval disregard by initially interpreting the statute
independent from the regulations it engendered. 9 The Board's
Sandoval argument that the regulation 9 prohibiting retaliation is an
94
"impermissible extension of the statute" entirely misses the point,
according to the majority. The Jackson majority "d[id] not rely on
regulations extending Title IX's protection beyond its statutory limits;
indeed [it did] not rely on... regulation at all" in recognizing a private right of action "because the statute itself contains the necessary
prohibition.
Justice Thomas's dissent argues that implied private rights of action are, or should be, rarities under the doctrines of textualism animating recent decisions. 9 He contends that no private right of action
exists for retaliation because Congress has not unambiguously imposed that condition on funding recipients and that Title IX does not
"evince a plain intent to provide such a cause of action." 97 The dissent suggests that, because the Court has been saying since Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington in 197998 that it will no longer imply a right of

action without clear statutory authorization, the Court must disregard
the chronology of the statute's enactment. 99
Under the reasoning of Justice Thomas and the textualists, implying remedies absent explicit textual authorization is never proper,
even if the legislative body which drafted the statute could have reaemploy in pari materia construction with Title VI, and to analyze Tide IX's relationship to the
regulation at issue. Id. at 1338-39.
91 Id. at 1339. See generally RUPERT CROSS,

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 128 (John Bell & Sir

George Engle eds., 2d ed. 1987) (discussing, inter alia, the jurisprudential tactic of examining
similar statutes for clues on how to interpret a statute in question).
92Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1507 (2005) (holding that Title
IX
prohibits funding recipients from retaliating against the whistle-blower who speaks out against
sex discrimination based on the statute's text).
93 Brief for the Respondent at 45,Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672).
94Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1501.
95 Id. at 1506-07.
96 Id. at 1514 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's jurisprudence requires
that
the statute at issue in Jackson clearly authorize retaliation claims).
97 Id. at 1510 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
98 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
99Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1515 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
100Id. at 1514; see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3, 13-14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining the theory of textualism and
noting that "[b]y far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to interpret the
meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations" and referring to statutory interpretation as "the principal business ofjudges and (hence) lawyers").
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sonably relied on then-existing precedent. The majority, however,
recognized that the congressional consciousness which drafted Title
IX in 1970 did not include Touche Ross's extreme admonition against
implying remedies.' Instead, the Congress who enacted Title IX was
working from the assumption that the Court would follow its own
permissively interpretive precedent set in the 1964 decision J.L Case
Co. v. Borak"°2 and its reading of Title VI as authorizing rights of ac03
tion against retaliation in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.'
4 with the text
Whereas Touche Ross requires that the "inquiry end[] '10
itself, the Court at the time of Title IX inquired beyond, asking
whether a proposed right of action would help accomplish legislative
purpose.
The chronological fact that "Congress enacted Title IX
just three years after Sullivan" provided the majority with "valuable
context for understanding the statute."' 06
Because the majority did not feel Touche Ross forbade it from examining the legislative context, it explored and found Title IX's legislative history persuasive on the arguments that the statute intended to
protect against retaliation, and that protection from retaliation was
necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose.' °7 The dissent criticizes
the majority for offering "nothing to demonstrate that its prophylactic rule is necessary to effectuate the statutory scheme" because students and their parents remain free to complain 0 8
Copious evidence demonstrating that protection from retaliation
is essential to Title IX existed in the Court's docket, 109
though it is not
101SeeJackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1506 ("Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan [in
1969], and accordingly that decision provides a valuable context for understanding the statute.... Retaliation forJackson's advocacy of the rights of the girls' basketball team in this case is
'discrimination' 'on the basis of sex,' just as retaliation for advocacy on behalf of a black lessee
in Sullivan was discrimination on the basis of race.").
103

377 U.S. 426 (1964).
396 U.S. 229 (1969).

104

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) (requiring affirmative evidence

102

of congressional intent to create a private remedy, and, finding none, admonishing that "the
inquiry ends there").
05 See Borak, 377 U.S. at 431 (creating a private right of action in the absence of express congressional authorization if private damages suits would aid in accomplishing legislative purpose).
106 Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1506; see also Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 29, at 5, 11 (reiterating that congressional intent may be inferred from
the fact that Title IX was enacted "just three years" after Sullivan).
107
Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1506-08.
108
Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1516 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109 See, e.g.,
Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Ass'n, American Ass'n of University Professors, American Volleyball Coaches Ass'n, National Fastpitch Coaches Ass'n, Intercollegiate Women's Lacrosse Coaches Ass'n, & Women's Basketball Coaches Ass'n in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 31, at 18 ("[E]ducators bring the vast majority of Title IX retaliation
cases ....These cases prove the point that educators put their very livelihoods at risk by standing up for Title IX enforcement."); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 40 (citing Sullivan
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directly cited by the majority." ° The United States' amicus brief catalogues some of the extensive documentation and testimony about the
widespread practice of retaliation, and its chilling effect on opposition to sex discrimination presented before Congress while it considered Title IX."' While the majority opinion does not cite this legislative history, it does acknowledge the conclusion that "[i]f recipients
were permitted to retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination would be loathe to report it, and all
2 manner of Title IX violations might go unremedied as a result.""1
Although neither Title IX nor Title VI mention retaliation, Title
VII lists retaliation in its catalogue of prohibited forms of employment discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee because, among other reasons, she has "oosed any practice made an
unlawful ... practice by [Title VII] ....
The Birmingham Board of Education urged that the Court deny a
private right of action under Title IX based on Title VII's list of prohibited employment actions." 4 Applying the maxim of interpretation
for the proposition that "'the only effective adversary' of discrimination is someone who is not
its direct target," in order to justify extending protection against retaliation to educators (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969))); Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 14-16 (asserting that retaliation
against educators was a problem prior to the enactment of Tide IX and quoting testimony before Congress on the issue); Brief of Amicus Curiae Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 31, at 18-26 (discussing the judicial history of finding implied
rights of action under the various civil rights statutes); see also NATIONAL COALITION FOR WOMEN
AND GIRLS IN EDUCATION, TITLE IX AT THIRTY: REPORT CARD ON GENDER EQUITY, 4 (2002)
(warning that a Supreme Court decision allowing retaliation would "significantly hamper efforts
to enforce Title IX"); Sarah L. Stafford, Progress Toward Title IX Compliance: The Effect of Formal
and Informal Enforcement Mechanisms, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1469 (2004) (focusing on compliance in
intercollegiate athletic programs).
"1 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508 (discussing generally the need for protection against
retaliation
in order to have effective protection against the discrimination proscribed by Title IX).
I Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 1416; see also DiscriminationAgainst Women: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Education of the H.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong. 302, 1051 (1970) (recounting the experiences of several women, who after seeking promotion to "upper-echelon, 'male only'jobs" in governmental
agencies, experienced retaliatory treatment as a result); 118 CONG. REc. 5812 (1972) (discussing the prevalence of retaliation against women who challenge acts of sex discrimination on
college campuses (cited in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 29, at 15-16)).
12 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229, 237
(1969), as support for the proposition that unchecked retaliation helps perpetuate discrimination).
51342 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2000).
'1 Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-9,Jackson,
125 S. Ct. 1497 (No.
02-1672) ("The absence of any mention of retaliation in Title IX... weighs powerfully against
a finding that Congress intended Title IX to reach retaliatory conduct. This conclusion is reinforced by the contrast between Title IX and Title VII, which contains an express prohibition
against retaliation." (internal citation omitted)).

Jan. 2006]

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"' Title VII would not cover any discrimination not included on its list. The Board urged an interstatutory application of this maxim: because the Title VII Congress
listed retaliation in the prohibited forms of discrimination, the Title
IX Congress must have intended to exclude retaliation by failing to
list it in the statute." The Eleventh Circuit agreed and relied on
Sandovals reasoning regarding Title VII's text and the regulations
promulgated from that text to draw its conclusion regarding Title
IX's rights of action.117
The majority also contrasted the two statutes, but they did not
agree. Justice O'Connor highlighted the relevant distinction between
the statutory construction underlying the two laws.118 Her opinion
pointed to "vastf]" differences in construction between Title VII and
Title IX. 19 She focused on opposing content and constructions in
the statutes, which require distinction rather than analogy in interpretation. The most profound difference was Title VII's express right
of action and detailed description of prohibited discriminatory conduct, versus Title IX's implied right of action and broad proscription
of discrimination followed by "specific, narrow exceptions.020 The
majority reasoned that congressional silence as to which specific practices the statute covers does not mean that a specific practice not
mentioned is not covered.12 1 The analogy to Title VI controlled. The
Title IX statute had an implied right of action for retaliation.
II
After crossing the interpretive threshold by finding a private right
of action for retaliation in Title IX itself, the Court addressed the
matter of who acquires this private right of action. 22 Whistleblowers
are protected under Title IX, but who can blow the whistle-coaches,
players, parents, or all of the above?

"Expression of one thing is exclusion of another." CROSS, supranote 91, at 138.
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 93, at 9 (contrasting Title IX with Title VII to reinforce its conclusion that their different constructions "militat[e] against an implied prohibition" on retaliation in Title IX because "[c]learly Congress knew how to prohibit retaliation
when it... chose" not to mention retaliation in Title IX).
117 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1345 (11th Cir. 2002).
118 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505.
119 Id. at 1505; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1998)
115
16

(highlighting that Title VII's cause of action is express, while Title IX's is implied).
120 Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505.
121 Id. ("Because Congress did not list any specific discriminatory practices
when it wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice does not tell us anything about whether it intended that practice to be covered.").
122 Id. at 1507.
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Jackson himself is male. He complained that the female students
on his girls' basketball team received insufficient funding and access. 123 The Board did not discriminate against him by under-funding
girls' basketball in comparison with the boys' team. After his complaint, however, Jackson received negative work evaluations and was
fired from his coaching position. 124 The Board discriminated against
him on the basis ofhis invocation of others' Title IX rights.
Rather than limiting the right of action to those private parties
who directly suffered the underlying discrimination, the Jackson Court
extends Tide IX's protection from the root of discrimination to its
branches. Agency doctrine, principles of statutory interpretation,
and precedent counsel that retaliation is "on the basis of sex" if it
punishes an actor for lodging a Tide IX complaint." Not only is the
coach a proper agent for his players, but he is in the "best position"
to recognize and address violations of their Title IX rights.126 It fulfills

congressional intent to enlist those in the "best position" to enforce
its statute by protecting them in their efforts. 12 In that way, the Court
showed that by protecting Titlelaw.'
IX 28 rights against retaliation, Jackson
case
conforms with statute and
Precedent speaks toJackson's ability to enforce others' civil rights,
and it also speaks to Congress's intent to continue that practice under Title IX. The Court first addressed the issue of retaliation under
civil rights statutes in the 1969 decision Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc.129 The § 1982 civil rights statute at issue protected a white land-

lord who complained of discrimination against his black tenant and
who suffered retaliation as a result of his complaints. 13 The extent of
Sullivan's protection draws one of the dividing lines between the maId. at 1503.
Id.
125 Id. at 1506-07.
126 Id. at 1508.
127 Id.
128 See Mank, supra note 67, at 106 (advocating that an implied right of action for employees
123
124

who protest intentional discrimination and suffer retaliation as a result would "effectuate § 601
and § 901's core prohibitions against intentional discrimination"); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 16 (No. 02-1672) ("A recipient of federal assistance certainly can have no legitimate interest in retaliating against persons who complain about unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, Title IX's bar on discrimination is best understood to encompass protection against retaliation."). Despite the Department of Justice's
assertion that there is no legitimate interest in retaliatory employment practices funded by federal money, the number of amici curiae for Respondent suggests otherwise.
129 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
1o Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505 ("[I]n Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial
discrimination to cover retaliation against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by
that prohibition."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1866) ("All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.").
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jority and dissenting opinions in Jackson. While Justice Thomas, in his
dissent, characterizes the Sullivan holding as deciding only that the
white landlord had standing to enforce rights of his black tenants, 3 '
the majority points to the opinion's stated holding that the landlord
had his own § 1982 cause of action to32 redress punishment "for trying
to vindicate the rights of minorities.'

The Sullivan decision prominently factors into the majority's interpretation of Title IX's construction, as well. Noting that Congress
enacted Title IX in 1972 ('just three years after Sullivan"3 3), the majority proceeds upon the "realistic" assumption that4 the statute comprehends and conforms with the Sullivan decision.1
Sullivan's reasoning remains powerfully relevant in the Title IX
context at issue thirty-six years later in Jackson. Just as Sullivan recognized that the white property owner "is at times 'the only effective adversary ''35 of racially discriminatory restrictive covenants, Jackson recognized that "sometimes adult employees are 'the only effective
adversar[ies]' of discrimination in schools.' ' 3

6

Even if they are not

the only effective adversaries, teachers and coaches may be the most
effective adversaries. Jackson and others-regardless of whether they
personally suffer underlying discrimination-are "often in the best
position to vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify discrimination and bring it to the attention of
administrators."' 33 The Jackson decision enlists victims of discrimination, as well as their agents who are in the best position to fight discrimination. The majority's decision ensures that those of chivalrous
good intentions need not subject themselves to punishment for protecting others' rights.
Distinctions from Title VII and precedent also led to the inclusion
of "indirect victim [s]

118in

Title IX's protection from retaliation. Ti-

tle VII focuses on the underlying victim, barring only discrimination
151
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1516 (Thomas, J.,dissenting) ("Rather than holding that a general
prohibition against discrimination permitted a claim of retaliation, Sullivan held that a white
lessor had standing to assert the right of a black lessee to be free from racial discrimination pursuant to [§ 19821."). The magistrate judge in the case dismissed on a misreading of Sullivan
similar to Thomas's. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., No. CV-01-TMP-1866-S, 2002 WL
32668124, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2002) ("[T]he court agrees that plaintiff has no standing to
assert the claims of the female members of the Ensley High School girls' basketball team for the
substantive violations of their right to equal educational opportunities under Title IX."). The
district court opinion did not cite or discuss Sullivan.
132Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505 n.1 (quoting Sullivan,
396 U.S. at 237).
133 Id. at 1506.
134 Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 699 (1979)).
135Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953)),
cited in
Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1508.
136Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508 (citing Sullivan,
396 U.S. at 237).
Id.
18 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 93, at 33, quoted inJackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1507.
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against a person "because of such individual's ... sex." 139 Title IX, by
contrast, focuses on the perpetrator's motivation, barring "discrimination ... on the basis of sex." 4 Because of this difference in statutory
language, the majority did not apply the Title VII cases' requirement
that a claim of intentional discrimination prove the claimant's sex
"actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.''
III
Spending Clause grant recipients must have notice that certain
conduct will subject them to liability under the funding statute. Because the Spending Clause acts as a contract between the federal and
state or local governments, the Supreme Court requires clarity in the
contract terms before it will enforce the contract against the recipient.1 42 "By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice" about liability under the statute, the Court "enable [s] the States to exercise
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.' '

43

The notice requirement for liability prevents recipients

from being unfairly caught in the maw of statutory interpretation-if
a judicial interpretation of the statute catches it unawares, the recipient will not be liable for acts completed before the court issued its in-

139 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (2004) (emphasis added).

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (emphasis added).
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (defining disparate treatment as less favorable
treatment because of victims' sex, etc.), cited in Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halder-man, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("IL]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.'").
143 Id.; accord Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) ("[A state who is a] recipient [of
federal funds conditioned on compliance with or enforcement of a statute] may be held liable
to third-party beneficiaries for intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the relevant
statute, but not for its failure to comply with vague language describing the objectives of the
statute[.]" (citation omitted)); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) ("We made clear
that unless Congress 'speak[s] with a clear voice,' and manifests an 'unambiguous' intent to
confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by
§ 1983." (quoting PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17)); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 167 (1992) ("[Wlhere Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) ("[11f Congress desires to condition the
States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously..., enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.'" (quoting
PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17)).
140
141
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terpretation. Congressional ambiguity and judicial unpredictability
should not punish state and local governments' good faith efforts to
comply with the statute.
The Birmingham Board tried to avoid liability for the alleged retaliation by maintaining that, even if Title IX and the Department of
Education regulation do permit a private cause of action, the Board
did not have notice that acceptance of Title IX funds would prohibit
The majority dispensed with this arthem from such retaliation.
gument by tracking twenty-five years of Title IX jurisprudence:
"[T]he Board should have been put on notice by the fact that our
cases since Cannon, such as Gebser and Davis, have consistently interpreted Title IX's private cause of action broadly to encompass diverse
forms of intentional sex discrimination.' 46 The Board had even
more specific notice that retaliation incurs liability because, at the
time it fired Jackson, all "the Courts of Appeals that had considered
the question... had already interpreted Title IX to cover retalia-

144See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994) (outlining an interpretive approach which incorporates history and context); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) ("American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation."); Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 79, at 63 (arguing that "[c] hanging the structure of laws, and the level of generality at which we read them,
is not some consequence of reading legislative history 'badly.' It is an outcome of the process
when done well"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987) (advocating that judges employ an interpretive method which incorporates the
social values of their time, in contrast with originalist methodology); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV.
26 (1994) (proposing that in addition to the traditional debate between legal formalism and
legal realism, scholarship should inquire from the "institutional perspective" by assessing the
behavior of the Supreme Court in both its descriptive and normative dimensions); Daniel A.
Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of
Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2005) (analyzing citation data from the 1984 and 1990
terms of the Supreme Court in an attempt to identify interpretive phenomena and predict future interpretation); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (proposing that Congress codify canons of statutory interpretation to
enhance clarity in legislation and judicial decision-making); Scalia, supra note 100 (defending a
textualist philosophy of statutory analysis); Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and
Statutory Interpretation,75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2004) (chronicling and explaining how William
N. Eskridge's and Justice Scalia's theories of interpretation rely on principles of democracy and
the rule of law; arguing that those similar foundations logically point to applying different interpretive techniques to the Constitution than to statutes); Adam W. Kiracofe, Note, The Codified Canons of Statutory Construction: A Response and Proposalto Nicholas Rosenkranz 's FederalRules of
Statutory Interpretation, 84 B.U. L. REV. 571, 606-07 (2004) (proceeding from the belief that
statutory interpretation needs improvement; proposing an alternative scheme of congressional
codification and enactment of the canons of statutory construction; arguing that, to eliminate
judicial guesswork and promote overall efficiency in the legal system, Congress should rely on
and refer to canons of construction in the text of its statutes).
145 Brief for Respondent, supra note 93, at 9.
146
Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1509.
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tion. ' ' 7 In light of broad statutory interpretation from the Supreme
Court, specific rulings from sister circuit courts, a precise federal
regulation, and the intentional nature of the act itself, any "reasonable school board would realize" that it "cannot cover up" Title IX
violations "by means of discriminatory retaliation.' 4 The majority
combined actual notice with the principles of good faith to apply its
Title IX interpretation to the Board's past conduct.
Justice Thomas lamented that this "rationale untethers notice
from the statute," requiring "clairvoyance from funding recipients"
rather than "clarity from Congress.' 9 He would require notice specifically written in the statute or case law from the mandatory jurisdiction, reading the Spending Clause as literally "in the nature of a contract,"' 50 without reliance on a reasonableness standard. 1
Regardless, the Jackson decision itself now provides clear and specific notice to institutions in every federal circuit who receive Title IX
funds that they may not retaliate against anyone who tries to enforce
the statute. The decision also posts notice that interpretation of
statutory intent has not been entirely eclipsed by textualism, and that
the Court will bolster private rights of action it has previously implied.

-Elizabeth Y. McCuskey*

Id. at 1510 (citing Lowrey v. Texas A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1997),
and Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994)).
148 Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
147

29, at 16 ("A recipient of federal assistance certainly can have no legitimate interest in retaliating against [Title IX complainants].").
149Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1515 (Thomas,J.,
dissenting).
10 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (characterizing Spending Clause legislation as "in the nature of a contract").
1
Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. The author
owes a great debt to Indraneel Sur's alacrity and ability to crunch convoluted concepts into
concise morsels. A similarly large debt is owed to the Journal of Constitutional Law's editorial
staff.

